Abstract. We study the behavior of strategic customers in an open-routing service network with multiple stations. When a customer enters the network, she is free to choose the sequence of stations that she visits, with the objective of minimizing her expected total system time. We propose a two-station game with all customers present at the start of service and deterministic service times, and we find that strategic customers "herd," that is, in equilibrium all customers choose the same route. For unobservable systems, we prove that the game is supermodular, and we then identify a broad class of learning rules-which includes both fictitious play and Cournot best response-that converges to herding in finite time. By combining different theoretical and numerical analyses, we find that the herding behavior is prevalent in many other congested open-routing service networks, including those with arrivals over time, those with stochastic service times, and those with more than two stations. We also find that the system under herding performs very close to the first-best outcome in terms of cumulative system time.
Introduction
In many large entertainment or commercial service environments, various services are provided at different stations, and individuals are often free to strategically choose their route through the system. For example, consider a catered reception with a buffet line in the main dining room and a beverage cart in the adjacent hall. A guest wants to visit both stations, but she may choose to do so in either order. The guest wishes to select the sequence that minimizes the time that she spends waiting in queues, but given that other guests are probably also attempting to do the same, which sequence should she choose?
This example highlights the strategic behavior of rational customers in service networks with open routing, that is, those in which customers can visit the stations in any order. The dynamics of service networks with open routing are more complex than those of systems in which customers merely choose a server, such as a grocery store where customers choose a checkout lane. In that example, once a customer has chosen her preferred lane, she is not impacted by the service process of any lane but her own. However, in a network with open routing, customers who choose different routes can still end up at the same station at the same time, directly impacting each other's waiting times. For instance, a customer who finishes service at station A and joins the queue at station B may encounter another customer there who chose to visit station B first and will visit station A later.
Open routing characterizes a variety of other service environments in addition to the aforementioned catering example. For instance, Baron et al. (2016) study an outpatient medical clinic in which patients receive a battery of tests over several hours. Tests may be administered in any order, and they numerically study the problem of a central planner who seeks to maximize patient satisfaction. Open-routing service systems also include amusement parks (where customers choose the order in which they visit the attractions), shopping centers (where customers choose the order in which they visit the stores), and college orientations (where students must accomplish multiple tasks, such as a campus tour and a residence hall visit, in any order).
Motivated by these applications, we study how strategic customers choose their routes in a stylized open-routing service environment. To achieve a broad understanding of the role of open routing, we characterize analytically the behavior of strategic customers in a two-station network under some restrictive assumptions, and employ numerical simulation to relax some of these assumptions and show that the same insights also hold in more realistic settings.
Management Science, 2019 , vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 735-750, © 2018 In the base model, we study a two-station network in which customers require services from both stations. Each station serves its customers on a first-come, first-serve (FCFS) basis. To model strategic open routing, we assume that each customer chooses her own route to acquire service from both stations in the network, with the objective of minimizing her expected total time in the system, and that all customers are present prior to the start of service. Intuitively, one might expect that a rational customer would attempt to avoid the popular route in order to receive service as quickly as possible. However, closer inspection reveals that a rational customer's decision is driven instead by the need to get into a favorable position at the more congested station. This leads to a surprising herding behavior: in any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, all customers choose exactly the same route. This behavior is related to the notion of "follow the crowd" as discussed in Hassin and Haviv (2003) and Hassin (2016) . After proving that any pure-strategy Nash equilibrium must involve herding, we then demonstrate that any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium must be unstable. Moreover, we show that a large and intuitive class of adaptive learning dynamics-which includes both fictitious play and Cournot best response-converges to herding at one of the two stations. The herding equilibria therefore emerge as the focal equilibria of the routing game.
While our base model does not directly solve any of the motivating problems discussed above, it uncovers the herding phenomenon in an open-routing service network, which bears further investigation. To verify the robustness of the herding behavior, we analyze strategic open routing in several different settings and its impact on social welfare. Our base two-station model in which all customers are strategic and present prior to the start of service is relaxed in several directions. Specifically, we relax our modeling assumptions by studying games with nonstrategic customers, customers who visit only one of the two stations, and service networks with more than two stations. In all of these settings, we find that strategic customers herd. The sequential version of the original game also displays herding, with the minor twist that the lastmoving player alone avoids the crowd. Additionally, we run a simulation study to test the robustness of herding. We find that, in the presence of congestion, herding continues to prevail in systems with stochastic service times and arrivals over time, with herding becoming less prominent as the arrival rate decreases and the systems become less congested. We also find that the social welfare under herding-as measured by the sum of the system times experienced by all customers in the network-is within a constant of the first-best outcome, and such a constant is independent of the number of players. For systems with many customers, this result implies that the welfare under herding differs only by a small fraction from the optimal social welfare.
The outline for the rest of the paper is as follows. We review the related literature in Section 2, and we introduce our base model in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the open-routing game, in which all customers are present in the system when service becomes available and make routing decisions about which station to visit first before learning their relative priority or the decisions of others. In Section 5, we derive the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential variant of the open-routing game; in that setting, customers are aware of their priority and of the routing decisions of those with higher priorities. Section 6 studies the system from the perspective of a central planner attempting to optimize the routing assignments of customers. Section 7 relaxes some assumptions of the open-routing game to allow for customers who wish to visit only one of the two stations and systems with more than two stations. Section 8 studies systems that do not experience congestion. Section 9 analyzes the output from a simulation study designed to test the robustness of herding in networks with stochastic service times and arrivals over time. Finally, Section 10 makes concluding remarks. In addition, all proofs for results presented in the paper are provided in Online Appendices A-D.
Literature Review
Our work is related to the literature on queues with strategic customers as well as the literature on congestion games. The first stream was started by Naor (1969) , who studied the use of tolls to induce desired behavior among customers in a queue. The second was begun by Braess (1968) , in his pioneering work demonstrating the now-famous Braess' Paradox. Hassin and Haviv (2003) provide a comprehensive survey of the existing strategic queueing literature, and Hassin (2016) provides an extremely thorough coverage of the more recent work in the area. Our model is perhaps most closely related to the work of Parlaktürk and Kumar (2004) . Theirs is one of only a few papers incorporating a stochastic network with stations in sequence in which customers choose the order of stations that they visit. The authors demonstrate the existence of unstable Nash equilibria for a two-station network in which every self-interested "job" must have two tasks performed on it, where each station can perform either task on a given job, and the first task takes on average a shorter time. Each station has a queue for Task 1 and another queue for Task 2, and the system planner may choose which queue to serve next at each station. By contrast, in our model each station can perform only one task and each station has only one queue; hence stations cannot dynamically distinguish between different classes of customers.
Other work in the vicinity includes that of Adiri and Yechiali (1974) , who relay a model of multiple queues for a single server, arranged and priced by priority. Their results mirror ours in that arriving customers choosing a queue must take into account the possibility of being preempted (cut in front of) by an arriving customer who chooses a higher priority queue. Naturally, an important distinction is that in our model there are two queues for two servers, as opposed to two or more queues for one server in their work. Most recently, Honnappa and Jain (2015) study what they call the "network concert queueing game." For feed-forward networks of several structures, they use fluid limits to determine symmetric equilibria and the price of anarchy when nonatomic users are allowed to choose both their arrival times and their routes through the network. Cohen and Kelly (1990) present an interesting analog of Braess' Paradox in a stochastic queueing network. They illustrate that when FCFS nodes are placed in sequence with infinite-server nodes, the mean sojourn time in equilibrium can actually increase if customers are given the ability to switch from one track to the other. The analysis is done in steady state and queue lengths are assumed to be unobservable, simplifying both the queueing and game theoretic portions of the analysis. Other important work in this stream includes Enders et al. (2008) and Glazer and Hassin (1983) .
On the empirical side, Pinilla and Prinz (2003) conduct a helpful, mainly simulation-based study of flexible routing schemes for shape deposition manufacturing. They study the standard sequential model and employ simulation to gain insights on a system that allows flexibility. They propose two examplesshape deposition manufacturing and routing in a coffee shop-which can be cast within the open-routing framework, and they find from simulation that performance can be significantly improved by dynamically assigning the sequence of tasks to be performed on each item, instead of following a fixed sequence of tasks. Su and Zenios (2004) model the U.S. kidney allocation system as an M/M/1 queueing system in which potential recipients monitor both their position in the queue and the quality of the organ offered to them. They find that the current benchmark of FCFS service results in socially suboptimal allocation of organs because strategic recipients tend to refuse lower quality organs, knowing that they will likely be offered a better organ later. Modifying the queueing discipline to last-come, first-serve leads to the socially optimal outcome, although the authors note that such a discipline will likely be considered too unfair to implement in practice. Schummer (2017) and Leshno (2017) also study allocation of objects to strategic customers on queue-like waiting lists.
Finally, Debo (2009, 2011) investigate competition between two service providers where queues build up and customers have private information regarding the quality of each provider, and they find herding behavior similar to what we discover here. However, the driving force behind their result is quite different from what we observe. In Debo (2009, 2011) , customers are motivated by service quality, while in our model the herding behavior occurs because customers require services at both stations and attempt to minimize their expected total time in the system. In our setting, although by starting with the lesscrowded station a customer may glean a shorter wait time before beginning her first service, afterward she will face a severe penalty upon arriving to the congested station and being near the end of the queue there. Additional related work includes Afèche and Mendelson (2004) , Debo and Veeraraghavan (2014) , and Cui and Veeraraghavan (2016) .
Several papers in the congestion literature also warrant discussion. Feldman and Tamir (2012) also consider "jobs" (customers) to be strategic. In their work, customers are allowed to choose from a set of machines working in parallel. They show that best-response dynamics do not always converge to a Nash equilibrium, but that the schedule generated by the longest processing time heuristic is indeed a Nash equilibrium if the number of machines is "right." An important difference from our analysis is that they do not incorporate the ordering of customers on a machine, instead modeling each player's cost function as merely the overall load of the machine chosen by that player. In the standard congestion model of which Braess' Paradox comprises a special case, Roughgarden and Tardos (2002) show that the price of anarchy is at most 4/3 when the performance measure is the total latency of the system and the latency functions are linear.
A Two-Station Service Network
Our setting is that of a service network with two stations, station A and station B, each with a single server, and with service rates µ A and µ B , respectively. The network serves N customers (or "players") who are all present in the system when service becomes available. We focus on the case in which the service rates are nonidentical, and thus without loss of generality we assume that the expected service time at station A is greater than that at station B (i.e., we have the service rate relation µ A < µ B ). Similar to many service environments, each station operates on a FCFS basis. Figure 1 gives a visual depiction of the network.
Every customer must visit each station exactly once, but the order in which to visit the stations is unrestricted. Customers seek to minimize their expected total time in the system; their action space is the set {AB, BA}, where the first letter denotes the station visited first. We will at times refer to AB customers to identify those who visit station A first. Similarly, BA customers are those who visit station B first. We note that the centralized (nonstrategic) version of the problem can be viewed as an open-shop scheduling problem with jobs that need to be processed by two servers, where either sequence is permissible for each job. A concise summary of the available results on open-shop scheduling can be found in Pinedo (2012, chapter 8 and section 13.4). For deterministic systems, there are polynomial-time algorithms available for makespan, but the problem of minimizing total completion time is NP-hard. For stochastic systems, the optimal policy for makespan is the longest expected remaining processing time first rule, and when the metric is expected total completion time, the preemptive shortest expected remaining processing time first policy is optimal among preemptive dynamic policies.
The Open-Routing Game
In this section, we study the open-routing game, in which all customers are present in the system when service becomes available and positions in the priority order are drawn uniformly at random. Players are aware that this randomization takes place, but they must make their routing decisions before learning their realized priorities or the routing decisions made by others. The open-routing game is therefore equivalent to a symmetric one-shot game in which all players make routing decisions simultaneously. Players seek to minimize their expected total time spent in the system. Service times at stations A and B are first assumed to be deterministic with rates µ A and µ B , respectively, such that µ A < µ B . In Section 4.5, we relax the deterministic service assumption to incorporate stochastic service times. These dynamics resemble service environments in which a large number of customers are present before the service starts.
We first make two observations that help us understand the system time experienced by customers choosing each of the two routes through the network. Property 1. If station B ever becomes idle, then it will never build up a queue again.
To understand Property 1, we note that, because µ A < µ B , the service time at station B is shorter than that at station A. Hence, after the first service begins, the arrivals to station B occur deterministically with an arrival rate that is smaller than station B's service rate. Therefore, once station B becomes idle, arrivals will never occur close enough together to form a queue. So, the system time for a customer who chooses route AB, and who has priority j at station A, depends on whether or not station B becomes idle before the customer departs station A. If station B idles, then the customer's system time is the sum of j service times at station A plus her own service time at station B. If station B does not idle, then the customer's system time is the sum of all of the service times at station B that must be completed up to and including herself. This will include all of the BA players, plus the j − 1 players in front of her at station A, as well as herself.
Property 2. Station A never idles from the time it begins its first service until it finishes serving all N customers.
Similarly to Property 1, Property 2 follows from the fact that, because µ A < µ B , the service time at station B is shorter than that at station A. As soon as station A begins service, it will complete a service every 1/µ A units of time, but it will receive an arrival every 1/µ B < 1/µ A units of time until the last BA player departs station B. Station A will then never become idle until it finishes its workload. The one way in which station A can idle is at the beginning, if all N players choose route BA: in that case, station A will idle during the first service time at station B, after which it will work continually until it finishes with all N customers.
One might expect that players minimizing their system times would attempt to avoid each other and seek a less congested route. Instead, when the number of players N is large enough, we find that in equilibrium players "herd"-that is, all players take the same route through the network.
Proposition 1 (Herding Equilibria in the Open-Routing Game). For N ≥ 2µ A /µ B + 1, the open-routing game has a Nash equilibrium in which all players "herd" at station A, that is, take route AB. Furthermore, if µ B < 2µ A and N ≥ max{µ B /µ A + 1, (2µ A + µ B )/(2µ A − µ B )}, then the game also has a Nash equilibrium in which all players herd at station B.
We next give an intuitive explanation of Proposition 1. In the first candidate profile, all players visit station A first, so a player will have on average half of the other customers behind her if she visits station A first. However, if she visits station B first while everyone else visits station A first, then she will be the last customer to receive service at station A. Therefore, if N is large enough-in fact, N ≥ 3 is sufficient here-then it is in her best interest not to deviate from the candidate profile. The herding equilibrium at station B can be similarly explained; intuitively, if N is large and the rest of the customers are slated to visit station B first, then a customer is better off being in front of an average of half of the other customers at station B. Otherwise, after visiting station A first she will certainly have to wait behind all of the other players at station B.
Proposition 1 establishes the existence of Nash equilibria that exhibit herding behavior. However, we must answer several questions to verify that these herding equilibria are indeed plausible: (i) can the herding equilibria be implemented via simple, decentralized learning dynamics? (ii) Are there other, nonherding Nash equilibria? (iii) What happens when some of the players are not strategic? To address these questions, we establish a key submodularity property for the players' expected system times in the open-routing game. This property then allows us to pinpoint the herding profiles as the focal equilibria of the game.
Submodularity of Expected System Time
Before deriving the submodularity property of the expected system time, we require some additional notation. Let i be an arbitrary player (or customer) index, s i the strategy of player i, and s −i the vector of strategies for all of the other players. We say that s i 1 if player i chooses route AB, and s i 0 if she chooses route BA. Similarly, a value of 1 for a given entry in s −i means that the corresponding player has chosen route AB, while a value of 0 for a given entry in s −i means that the corresponding player has chosen route BA. Denote by T(s i , s −i ) the expected system time for a player who employs strategy s i when her opponents play the profile s −i . Note that the uniform priority randomization means that the game is symmetric, and thus we require no player index on T. Following the definition of Topkis (1998) and letting ≤ denote the usual partial order, we will show that the function T(s i , s −i ) is submodular, that is, that it has decreasing differences. Specifically, we will find that
The decreasing differences condition (1) trivially holds ifs i s i , so we can focus on the case in which s i 0 and s i 1. Moreover, because all customers are present when service starts and priorities are drawn uniformly at random, we can replace s −i with the sum of its entries, m, and T(s i , s −i ) with T(s i , m). The variable m then simply represents the number of playersexcluding player i-who have chosen route AB. With a slight abuse of notation, we can replace the decreasing differences condition (1) with
We now introduce the shorthand
and rewrite condition (2) as
The difference d m represents the relative preference of player i between route AB and route BA, given that m other players chose route AB; a negative value indicates that route AB will result in a shorter expected system time, and a positive value means that route BA will yield a shorter expected system time. Similarly, a relatively smaller value of d m indicates a relatively greater preference for route AB. Therefore, if Equation (3) holds-and we will show that it does-then the greater the number of other customers who have chosen route AB, the greater relative preference each customer will have for route AB.
Proposition 2 (Submodularity of Expected System Time).
If
then each player's expected system time in the open-routing game is submodular. Moreover, we have
Observe that dm < 0 implies that, if a player were aware that exactlym others were choosing route AB, then her expected system time for route AB would be less than that for route BA, and thus she would prefer route AB. Furthermore, the decreasing differences property gives us that if dm < 0, then d m < 0 also for m ≤ m, and therefore for anym ≤ m, a player who knew that m others had chosen route AB would also want to choose route AB. Intuitively, a critical mass of players choosing a given route tends to attract the remaining players to the same route; if many players go to station A first, then the others should join them, and similarly for station B. We will revisit this idea in the next subsection when we discuss convergence of adaptive dynamics to the herding equilibria. The strict inequality in Equation (4) of Proposition 2 plays a key role in establishing this convergence.
Management Science, 2019 , vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 735-750, © 2018 Proposition 2 implies that if, as we henceforth assume, players' utility functions decrease linearly with their expected system times, then their utility functions are supermodular, and the open-routing game is a supermodular game in the sense of Topkis (1998, section 4.1). Supermodular games have received much attention in the literature. For example, it is well documented that if a supermodular game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then a wide range of learning rules will converge to it (see Milgrom and Roberts 1990) . However, because the game that we study has multiple equilibria, we cannot directly apply the classical convergence result. Nevertheless, in the subsequent subsection, we apply supermodularity and the strict inequalities in Equation (4) to prove that in our game, a large class of learning rules converges to one of the herding equilibria. Next, we state a corollary that follows directly from the proof of Proposition 2, which will also be used in the derivation of the subsequent convergence result.
Adaptive Dynamics Converge to Herding
As we have seen, when the service rates are close together and N is large, the herding strategy profiles are Nash equilibria. We next show that in addition, a general class of decentralized learning processes will converge to one of these herding equilibria.
We propose a model of learning that allows customers to update their beliefs in each period based on the play observed and also incorporates a "memory" of past actions. First, we assume that in each period players choose their routes to minimize their expected system times based on their current beliefs about other customers' strategies. When a player faces a tie, we assume that the player always chooses route AB. Let β
i, j is player i's probability assessment, at the beginning of period t, that exactly j players (not including herself) will take route AB in period t, for j 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. We allow the initial beliefs, β
(1) i , to be an arbitrary vector of probabilities summing to one. Next, let x (t) be the realized total number of players who take route AB in period t, and let x (t) i be the decision of player i (with x (t) i 1 for choosing route AB and 0 otherwise). We also let x (t) −i denote the realized number of players who take route AB in period t, excluding player i; that is, x
i . Player i is making a decision in period t based on β (t) i , her belief at the beginning of period t, which incorporates her experience up to and including period t − 1.
For m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}, let e(m) ∈ N be the vector with a one in the (m + 1)st entry, and zeros in all of the remaining entries. Given a sequence of real numbers {α t } with 0 ≤ α t ≤ 1 for all t 1, 2, . . ., the beliefs in our model satisfy the recursion
We give the name {α t }-learning to the process in which beliefs evolve according to Equation (5). Intuitively, a larger α t implies that the players are giving more weight to their experience in period t, and less weight to earlier periods. We also note that choosing α t 1/t results in the familiar learning rule known as fictitious play introduced in Brown (1951) . Within fictitious play learning, players best respond to the empirical frequency of past moves. Similarly, by letting α t 1 we recover the Cournot best-response model, in which players best respond to the path of play realized in the prior period. The interested reader is referred to Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for detailed discussion of the Cournot model (chapter 1), fictitious play (chapter 2), and other learning models.
Next we show that under a mild regularity condition on the sequence {α t } and on the initial beliefs β and consider the {α t }-learning process in Equation (5).
and (iii) there exists some l ≥ 1 such that x (l) m * , then players will converge to one of the herding equilibria in finitely many periods. That is, there exists t 0 < ∞ such that either
In Proposition 3, condition (6) essentially enforces that players' earlier beliefs and actions must eventually fade so that play does not get stuck on strategy profiles that are anchored to initial beliefs. For example, natural learning rules such as fictitious play and Cournot best response satisfy this condition. This result reinforces the intuition that many players choosing a given route exerts a pull on others to do the same. The only circumstance that can possibly avoid herding is that in which x (t) m * for all t 1, 2, . . .. For this stagnation to occur, we must have x (1) m * , an unlikely event if N is large and, say, initial beliefs are drawn as independent random vectors uniformly distributed on the N-dimensional probability simplex. Even if this firstperiod event is realized, route switching in later periods is inevitable because the beliefs of AB customers will be moving to favor route BA, and those of BA customers will be moving to favor route AB. When this route switching occurs, it must always be perfectly symmetric to maintain x (t) m * , which is also unlikely. The proof of Proposition 3 leverages the submodularity of the expected system time established by Proposition 2. Intuitively, if the number of players taking route AB is strictly greater than m * , then the players currently taking route AB have no incentive to switch, in this period or in any later period, because the beliefs that led them to select route AB in the current period will be further reinforced. Then, given that there will always be more than m * players on route AB in the future periods, the players who chose route BA will eventually switch to route AB, provided that they sufficiently update their beliefs, as in condition (6). Similarly, if the number of players taking route AB is strictly less than m * in some period, one can deduce that eventually all players will converge to route BA. This result reiterates the herding phenomenon: many players on a single route attract the others to join them.
Next, we state a corollary that shows that for Cournot best response, the requirement of x (l) m * is not required when N is large enough.
Corollary 2 (Convergence of Cournot Best Response).
Under Cournot best response, if N > max{N sub , 2µ A / (µ B − µ A )}, then players will converge to one of the herding equilibria in finitely many periods.
Equilibrium Refinement
We have established that in the open-routing game, players following intuitive learning rules such as Cournot best response will converge to one of the herding equilibria. We now again invoke the submodularity of the expected system time to show that the herding profiles are the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria for this game. However, Corollary 3 does not completely rule out the existence of Nash equilibria in which players adopt mixed strategies. Our next result rules out any Nash equilibria in which some but not all players use properly mixed strategies, and shows that any mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium is not stable enough to survive even the slightest perturbation in another player's strategy. Therefore, the herding equilibria are the only purestrategy Nash equilibria of the open-routing game, and in any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium it must be that all players employ properly mixed strategies (i.e., no one plays a pure strategy). Such mixed-strategy equilibria, however, are quite unstable and unlikely to be implemented.
Proposition 4 (Elimination and Instability of Mixed Equilibria
Exploiting the decreasing differences property of the expected system time, we also find that if there is significant service rate disparity-specifically, if service at station B is more than twice as fast as service at station A-then route AB is a strictly dominant strategy for all players.
Corollary 4 (Dominant Strategy). If 2µ A ≤ µ B and N > N sub , then route AB is a strictly dominant strategy for all players.
The dominant strategy result can be understood via the following rough argument. Consider a customer contemplating her move, and suppose that the other N − 1 customers are playing route BA. If she follows the crowd on route BA, then, on average, she will be behind half of the other customers, first at station B and then again at station A. Since station A is the bottleneck, her expected system time will be on the order of N/(2µ A ). If instead she chooses route AB, then her system time will be a deterministic N/µ B . Because 2µ A ≤ µ B , it is better for her to choose route AB over route BA. Then, because N > N sub , if any customer shifts to route AB, then the decreasing differences property implies that her preference for route AB will only increase, and therefore route AB is her optimal strategy regardless of the moves of the other customers. So, if the service rates are close together, then both herding profiles are Nash equilibria, while if they are far apart, then it is a dominant strategy to visit the slower station A first.
With these results in favor of the herding equilibria and the fact that an intuitive class of learning rules converges to them, we see that the herding effect exerts a strong influence on the behavior of rational customers in the open-routing game. We note that this herding effect coincides with several examples of open routing. At catered events, anecdotal evidence suggests that guests often flock to the buffet line (the slower station) even when others are doing the same, presumably to avoid waiting in an even longer queue there if they instead got their drink first; also in theme parks, although customers do not all start at the same station, many customers rush to the most popular rides first to experience them before the queue grows long.
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The Open-Routing Game with
Nonstrategic Customers In practice, some (perhaps many) customers may not attempt to minimize their overall expected system times. For example, at a catered reception a guest may have a preference that dictates a certain route irrespective of its effect on her total system time. Accordingly, we now examine the effect on the system of customers who are not strategic, that is, customers who must visit both stations but who have a predetermined route that they will follow without contemplating any alternative.
To this end, consider a system as described in Section 3 with N customers, and again assume that priorities are drawn uniformly at random. Suppose now that N N AB + N BA + N S , where N AB is the number of nonstrategic customers who will take route AB no matter what, N BA is the number of nonstrategic customers who will take route BA no matter what, and N S is the number of strategic customers. In this system, a strategic customer could feasibly encounter N AB , . . . , N AB + N S − 1 other customers choosing route AB. Therefore, we can focus on
Recall that d m represents the relative preference between route AB and route BA for a strategic customer, when there are m other customers choosing route AB.
By Proposition 2, we immediately have that d m is decreasing in m in the range of N AB , . . . , N AB + N S − 1 as long as N > N sub . Therefore, as in Section 4.1, the expected system times for the customers that are strategic are submodular. The submodularity in turn implies that the herding equilibria (among the strategic customers) prevail as the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria. This is summarized in the next corollary.
Corollary 5 (Equilibria with Nonstrategic Customers). If N > N sub , then exactly one of the following holds (i) Route AB is a dominant strategy for all strategic customers.
(ii) Route BA is a dominant strategy for all strategic customers.
(iii) Both herding profiles are Nash equilibria, and there are no other pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
We note that Proposition 3 also holds in this setting with nonstrategic customers, in the sense that strategic customers will converge to one of the herding equilibria under a general class of learning dynamics. These results suggest that customers who are aware that some others are not rational can still implement an equilibrium profile that involves herding. Moreover, depending on the system parameters, herding at one station can be a dominant strategy.
The Stochastic Open-Routing Game
We now discuss how the herding behavior that we observe in the open-routing game continues to emerge when the service times are stochastic. We refer to this new setting as the stochastic open-routing game. Specifically, for µ A < µ B we now suppose that the service times at stations A and B are independent and identically distributed random variables with means 1/µ A and 1/µ B and variances σ 2 A and σ 2 B , respectively. Properties 1 and 2 do not extend to this environment because the uncertainty in service times may induce idle and busy periods that did not arise in the deterministic setting. As a result, we can no longer express customers' expected system times in closed form. Nevertheless, we can bound the expected system times when all customers herd by applying existing results from queueing theory. More specifically, when all customers choose route AB, the waiting times at station B behave as in an underloaded GI/GI/1 queue (single-server queue with general independent arrival and service time distributions) that started empty, with arrival rate µ A and service rate µ B . Then, a stochastic dominance argument from Müller and Stoyan (2002, Theorem 6.2.1) tells us that we can bound the expected waiting time at station B for any customer in this GI/GI/1 queue by the expected steady-state waiting time. Combining this argument with the classical steady-state result of Kingman (1962) , we then bound the expected system time for all of the customers who take route AB, and this bound holds for any value of N. Under suitable conditions, we have that our upper bound for the expected system time on route AB is smaller than the expected system time on route BA, and therefore it is a Nash equilibrium for all customers to choose route AB.
Proposition 5 (Nash Equilibrium with Route AB-Stochastic Service). If
then it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for all customers to choose route AB.
Next, we consider the case in which all customers are choosing route BA. In this case, the waiting times at station A behave as in an overloaded GI/GI/1 queue with arrival rate µ B and service rate µ A , which does not have a steady-state distribution. To bound the expected waiting time in an overloaded GI/GI/1 queue, we apply Lindley's equation to show that the total idling time is represented by the "dual" process of the overloaded system, and that this dual process has the same distribution as the waiting time in an underloaded GI/GI/1 queue (see Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001, section 11.5 ). This allows us to bound the total expected idling time and to show that under suitable conditions it is a Nash equilibrium for all customers to choose route BA. The result is summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 6 (Nash Equilibrium with Route BA-Stochastic Service). If we have µ A < µ B < 2µ A and
then it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium for all customers to choose route BA.
The Sequential Open-Routing Game
We have thus far assumed that customers had no visibility into the state of the network when making routing decisions, that is, that they were not aware of their relative priorities or of the decisions made by others. In many applications, however, customers may have some knowledge about their position in the queue and about the routes that others have chosen. For example, in service systems such as amusement parks, at times customers may prequeue, allowing them at the preset opening time to choose their route conditioned on the actions of those preceding them. To investigate a system where customers have knowledge about their position, we consider the sequential open-routing game, in which customers make decisions according to their relative position among the N customers and can observe the routes chosen by those who move before them. This setting facilitates a natural representation as an extensive-form game, and we will find its unique subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction. We remark that the open-routing game of Section 4 represents one extreme, in which customers have no information apart from the system parameters (µ A , µ B , and N), while the sequential open-routing game that we study here corresponds to the other extreme, in which customers have perfect information regarding their position and the state of the network prior to their decision. Interestingly, in this sequential environment we also observe a phenomenon that is similar to the herding behavior observed in the open-routing game: in equilibrium all customers but one visit the slower station A first.
Here we again consider a two-station service network with deterministic service times and N customers present at the beginning of service availability. We note, however, that unlike the open-routing game of Section 4, the sequential open-routing game is not symmetric, and accordingly the customer index i will no longer be arbitrary. We index customers i 1, 2, . . . , N, by the order in which they make routing decisions, so customer 1 is the first to move, customer 2 is the second, etc. We also assume that a customer's position in the order corresponds to her priority, so customer 1 will be served first at whichever station she chooses, and customer i ≥ 2 will wait behind any customers in the set {1, . . . , i − 1} who have chosen the same route as her. Next, for i 1, 2, . . . , N, we define y A i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , i} to be the number of players that have chosen route AB, up to and including customer i. To derive the subgame perfect equilibrium via backward induction, we need to analyze the total time that player N, the last customer to make her routing decision, spends in the system under different strategy profiles. The state observed by player N depends only on y A N−1 , the number of the first N − 1 customers that chose route AB.
System Time for Customer N
Given a value of y A N−1 , we use S A N to denote the system time that customer N, the last customer to move, experiences if she takes route AB, and S B N to denote the system time that she experiences if she takes route BA.
Because µ A < µ B and the service times are deterministic, we see that if customer N first visits the faster station B, followed by the slower station A (i.e., she chooses route BA), then she experiences exactly the same system time as if she merely joined a queue of N − 1 customers all waiting at station A, as long as at least one customer before her chose route AB (i.e., as long as y 0, then the above is still true except that station A sits idle until the first departure from station B, so customer N's system time is increased by 1/µ B . Therefore, we can express S B N , the system time for the case in which customer N chooses route BA, as
Now, suppose that customer N chooses route AB, visiting the slower station A first, followed by the faster station B. If player N arrives at station B and finds it idle, then S A N , the system time that she experiences if she visits station A first, is simply equal to (y A N−1 + 1)/µ A , the time that she spends at station A, plus the time it takes for her to be served at station B, which is equal to 1/µ B . If player N arrives at station B and finds it busy, then by Property 1, station B must never have been idle since it started service. As player N will be the last customer served at station B, we have then that S A N is equal to N/µ B . To summarize, the system time that customer N experiences from visiting station A first, S A N , is given by
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Equilibrium Strategy Profile
With the evaluation of customer N's system times we deduce her strategy in the set of subgame perfect equilibria. Because µ A < µ B , whenever the second condition in Equation (10) If instead the first condition in Equation (10) Intuitively, one might expect that customers should join the queue with the shortest wait time because that minimizes their waiting time before getting served at one of the two stations. However, Proposition 7 states that if customers are rational, then all except the last will first visit station A, which is slower and which each customer except the first one observes to have more customers in its queue than station B. This behavior is best explained by what we call delayed overtaking. If customers later in the order will visit the slower station A first, then it is in the best interest of a customer who moves earlier to immediately join the queue at station A because otherwise, during her time at the faster station B, others will overtake her at station A.
Interestingly, we observe that the optimal actions of the first N − 1 customers are completely independent of the state that they observe and are essentially driven by the strategies of those later in the order. Note also that the equilibrium actions-that is, the herding profiles-from the open-routing game of Section 4 cannot be supported as equilibria (Nash or subgame perfect) for the sequential game. Namely, if the last customer to move is aware of her position and the decisions of the other customers, then her best response to all of the earlier customers visiting the same station (either A or B) is always to visit the other station, breaking both of the equilibria of Proposition 1. However, in equilibrium only one customer visits station B first here, so the subgame perfect equilibrium of this section is quite similar to the herding equilibrium at station A discussed in Section 4. Therefore, in an environment in which decisions are made sequentially, the pull to the slower station has the strongest impact on behavior, and the delayed overtaking effect dominates.
On the whole, we find that behavior in the sequential open-routing game parallels that of the one-shot version. The most important departures are (i) that the delayed overtaking effect always dominates in the sequential environment, supporting a form of herding only at the slower station; and (ii) that in equilibrium the last customer, recognizing that she is the last to move, takes the opposite route of all of the other players.
Herding vs. Central Optimum
We consider now a central planner who wishes to optimize social welfare in the open-routing service network of Sections 4 and 5. We take as our measure of social welfare the sum of the system times of all customers. The central planner's problem is to minimize this quantity, which we call cumulative system time. We compare the cumulative system time under herding with the optimal cumulative system time, first by deriving bounds on the suboptimality of herding and then by numerically solving for the optimal routing. We end by discussing the implications of these results on the price of anarchy.
Cumulative System Time Under Herding
If 0 ≤ x ≤ N customers are assigned to route AB, then denote by D(x) the corresponding cumulative system time. The functional form of D(x), along with a discussion of the intuition behind it, can be found in Online Appendix B. We note that
that is, the cumulative system time is the same under either herding profile. We let D H N denote the quantity in Equation ( 
The bounds (12) are independent of the population size N, and the ratio of this gap to the optimal cumulative system time rapidly approaches 0 as N grows. As we discuss below, numerical evidence suggests that in most cases assigning exactly one customer to route AB minimizes the cumulative system time. In those cases the optimality gap is usually equal to one service time at station A.
Exact Central Optimal Solution
With Proposition 8 bounding the optimality gap of herding, we now numerically solve the central planner's problem for a variety of parameter values. The main observation worth noting is that, for all of the parameter combinations that we have studied, the minimal cumulative system time D * N is attained by setting the number of AB customers to one. The reason for doing so, instead of assigning all of the customers to herd on route BA (i.e., setting x 0) is to avoid inducing idle time at station A during the first service time at station B. The opposite extreme of assigning all customers to herd on route AB induces a similar idle time problem at station B, resulting in equivalent cumulative system time to the case with x 0. Still, the difference in cumulative system time when setting x 0 instead of x 1 is usually negligible, as we will observe. We compute and study the cumulative system time for a range of parameter values. Fixing µ B 1 and taking N 50, we compute the cumulative system time vector (letting x 0, 1, . . . , N) for all values of µ A ∈ {1 × 10 −5 , 2×10 −5 , . . . , 99,999×10 −5 }. Table 1 shows the maximum percentage difference between the cumulative system time under herding and the minimal cumulative system time, over ranges of µ A . In all cases the cumulative system time under herding is less than a tenth of a percent above optimal. 
Price of Anarchy
In Sections 4 and 5, we found that self-interested customers followed the crowd to the same route. The optimal outcome under a social planner is quite similar. Rather than balancing the workload across the two queues, a social planner should send almost all of the customers to the same station first. The intuition has to do with the fact that if the queues are of similar length at both stations, then the first customer to exit the system will not do so until she has waited a substantial amount of time for her second service. The performance of such a load-balancing routing assignment is close to that of the worst possible routing scheme (see also Figure EC .1 in Online Appendix B). Conversely, if all customers are assigned to the same route, then the early customers have a short (if any) wait at both stations. Whoever the final customers are to leave the system, they cannot possibly leave until station A processes everyone before them, and that time serves as a lower bound on their system times. But for the customers early in the order, their system times are significantly shorter if customers are concentrated on one route. These results lead to an interesting observation regarding the price of anarchy. The price of anarchy is defined as the ratio between the social welfare in the worst equilibrium outcome and the best outcome achievable by a social planner (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 2009) . In the open-routing game of Section 4, the pure-strategy price of anarchy is close to 1 because the equilibrium outcome sends everyone to the same station, and the difference in social welfare between this and the optimum is quite small. Moreover, as N grows the price of anarchy converges to 1 by Proposition 8. As rational customers will herd in equilibrium, the good overall performance of herding with respect to the cumulative system time is encouraging for managers. In the event that customers are not fully rational, there is a strong argument for managers to incentivize herding among their customers, as it is a simple strategy with near-optimal performance.
The Prevalence of Herding
We have seen that the herding behavior predominates in the open-routing game. With enough players, the herding equilibria are always the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. Furthermore, when the service rates are far apart, customers have a strictly dominant strategy that implements the herding equilibrium at station A. The herding equilibria continue to hold even when some customers are not strategic and have their routes fixed in advance, or when we allow for stochastic service times. In the sequential variant of the open-routing game, we similarly observe a form of herding, albeit only at the slower station A. In this section, we overview additional settings in which the herding behavior continues to prevail. The technical details associated with this overview are discussed in Online Appendix C.
Customers Who Visit Only One Station
First, we discuss the impact of "dedicated" customers, who require service only at one of the two stations. In the context of the open-routing game of Section 4, we now relax the assumption that all customers must visit both stations. Specifically, we decompose N as N N A + N B + N S , where N A customers visit only station A, N B customers visit only station B, and the remaining N S customers are strategic, that is, they visit both stations but may choose the order. When there are enough strategic players, both the herding profile at station A and that at station B are Nash equilibria of this game. The intuition behind the proof is similar to that of the open-routing game. If all of the strategic customers herd at station A, then a customer who deviates will again be the last customer to be served at station A, and therefore she prefers to follow the crowd. We also observe in several numerical experiments that the expected system time appears to be submodular as long as most of the customers are strategic and there is not too much imbalance in the number of dedicated customers at each station. These numerical experiments are detailed in Online Appendix C. The herding behavior is robust to the presence of dedicated customers who require service only at one of the two stations.
-Station Open-Routing Game
We now discuss systems with more than two stations. Consider a generalized version of the open-routing game of Section 4 for a system with stations and N players. For stations ξ 1, 2, . . . , , let µ ξ be the service rate at station ξ, and assume that µ 1 < µ 2 < · · · < µ .
If players make routing decisions simultaneously and if priorities are drawn uniformly at random, then players must choose from among the ! possible routing vectors. In this case, we have a Nash equilibrium that is analogous to that in the open-routing game with two stations. Specifically, it is a Nash equilibrium for players to choose a route that visits stations in order of increasing service rate, from the slowest to the fastest. Thus once again we have a herding effect, where players follow the crowd and congregate at a single station.
Queueing Networks in Steady State
In all of the systems that we have studied thus far, the open-routing service networks were congested, that is, until all customers had arrived, the service rates were lower than the customer arrival rates. In all of those systems, the herding phenomenon has prevailed. We now turn to the question of whether herding behavior continues to emerge in a service network that does not face congestion. Specifically, we investigate equilibrium behavior when customers arrive according to a Poisson process with rate λ, rather than all being present in the system when service becomes available. Again, every customer must be processed at both station A and station B. Service times at stations A and B are independent and exponentially distributed with rates µ A and µ B , respectively. Here we take λ < µ A < µ B , and we assume that arriving customers find the queueing network in steady state and are served in order of arrival at each station. Note that λ < µ A implies that, in contrast to earlier settings, with positive probability station A will have idle time in between services. The state of the system is not observable to the customers, that is, customers may not condition their actions on the system state that includes the queue lengths and types of customers at both stations.
The distribution of the queue length encountered by a customer at the first station in her route is the steady-state distribution of the queue length at that station. In addition, classical results from Kelly (1979) give us that the distribution for the queue length observed by a customer at the second station in her route also matches the steady-state distribution for the queue length at that station. Next, we state a lemma that is a version of Corollary 3.5 from Kelly (1979) modified to our queueing network, which has customer types AB and BA, and queues A and B.
Lemma 1 (Kelly 1979, Corollary 3.5) . When a customer of type ψ ∈ {AB, BA} reaches station ξ ∈ {A, B}, the probability that she finds κ customers at station ξ is equal to the steady-state probability that there are κ customers at station ξ.
We use "type" to refer to a realized route through the network (AB or BA) and "group" to refer to a subset of the population that shares an ex ante routing probability. Specifically, let p (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) be a (possibly infinite-dimensional) vector of routing probabilities corresponding to the strategies chosen by the corresponding groups, for example, p 1 is the probability that a customer in group 1 chooses route AB. Let z (z 1 , z 2 , . . .) be a vector of strictly positive numbers summing to 1 representing the percentage of the population in each group. The vectors p and z together specify a strategy profile for the entire population. In this setting, we define our notion of equilibrium to be that customers of every group must be best responding to the strategy profile defined by p and z. As the expected system time is the same for either route, customers of every group are playing a best response to all other groups, and there is no incentive for members of any group to change their strategy. Therefore, any p and z form an equilibrium strategy profile.
Observe that when the system is allowed to reach steady state, the herding profiles in which all customers choose the same route are indeed equilibria. However, as any other feasible routing profile also forms an equilibrium, there is no reason to give special preference to the herding profiles in this setting. Consequently, these results suggest that the herding behavior that prevails in congested service networks no longer predominates in systems that are not very busy.
Simulation Study for Systems with Stochastic Arrivals
We have shown that herding occurs in congested openrouting service networks if all customers are present at the start of service. Moreover, our results in Section 8 suggest that herding probably does not occur in a system that is not congested, that is, with a service rate faster than the arrival rate. These analyses lead naturally to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1.
Herding occurs when a service system is congested, that is, the arrival rate is higher than the service rates of both stations until the arrival of the last customer.
We are interested in Hypothesis 1 because the arrival rate to a service system is often not constant, and a service system may experience a high customer arrival rate especially at the start of its service availability. Note that if we assume that customers are fully rational in the open-routing game with stochastic arrival times, then each customer would be required to perform prohibitively difficult analysis to solve for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Even highly intelligent customers are unlikely to implement such outcomes. Accordingly, we next perform a simulation study designed to test Hypothesis 1. We assume that the simulated customers learn about the system through repeated rounds of play, and we simulate systems in which customers arrive stochastically over time and the service times at both stations are stochastic.
Simulation Setup
The setting for the simulation is as follows. Play proceeds for multiple rounds, and customers update their beliefs after each round of play based on the wait time that they experience. In each round, customers also observe what their wait time would have been had they chosen the opposite route, fixing the moves of the other customers. Thus, in each round all customers get samples for both routes. Each customer's assessment of her expected system time on a particular route is equal to the empirical average of her own samples for that route across all rounds. Moves are randomly generated in the first round, and thereafter each customer chooses the route with the smaller expected system time according to her beliefs in that round.
We define the parameters γ and φ to control the mean and variance of the arrival times. Specifically, the arrival time of customer i ∈ {1, . . . , N } is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [iγ − φ, iγ + φ]. Thus the mean arrival time for customer i is equal to iγ, and the width of the uniform distribution is 2φ. Arrival times of different customers are mutually independent. If φ is large enough relative to γ, then successive intervals may overlap and customers may not always arrive in the same order. For example, if γ 0.1 and φ 0.25, then the arrival time of customer 1 will be uniformly distributed on [−0.15, 0.35] , the arrival time of customer 2 will be uniformly distributed on [−0.05, 0.45], etc. Service times at each station are taken to be exponentially distributed, where the service rate µ B at station B is fixed at 1 and the rate µ A at station A varies in each run.
We simulated all combinations of γ ∈ {0.001, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, φ ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}, and µ A ∈ {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75}, for a total of 120 experiments. For each parameter combination we ran 100 independent trials with 250 rounds of play in each trial. In all cases we consider N 50 customers. We analyze the results of the simulation study in the next subsection.
Results of Simulation
In Figure 2 , we depict the empirical frequencies for the number of simulated customers who choose route AB in the final round (round 250) for three different values of the service rate µ A . The left panel shows the results when the arrival times are deterministic and the arrival order is fixed, that is, when γ 0.001 and φ 0. This example closely resembles the sequential open-routing game of Section 5, where customers are all present at Management Science, 2019 , vol. 65, no. 2, pp. 735-750, © 2018 time zero and make their moves sequentially. In the simulation, unlike in Section 5, customers are not able to observe the moves of those before them in the order when making their routing decisions. Similarly, customers do not explicitly incorporate the strategies of later arrivals. Instead, each customer decides her route based on her experience from the historical rounds.
Recall from Proposition 7 that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential game, the first N − 1 customers choose route AB, and the final customer chooses route BA. Referring to the plot in the left of Figure 2 , we see that the outcome of the simulation is similar to the equilibrium; the density is mostly concentrated close to 50. As noted, in our simulated system, customers do not condition their strategies on the moves of earlier arrivals, and we therefore do not always see exactly N − 1 customers choosing route AB. Still, experience from the previous rounds has taught them that if they take route BA, then they may be overtaken at station A by later arrivals, resulting in more total time in the system. The same observation persists for all values of µ A .
In the right panel of Figure 2 , we see results for the case in which again customers all arrive very close to the start of service, but now there is significantly more variance in the arrival order. We thus have a setting that is reminiscent of the one-shot open-routing game of Section 4. The arrival times have the same tightly spaced means-γ 0.001-as in part (a). Now, however, we have φ 0.75, which is much greater than the successive difference in mean arrival times γ. Far from a fixed order, each player now could arrive in any position among the 50 customers. As she forms her beliefs over several rounds, the empirical averages will reflect this randomness in her priority.
Continuing to consult the right plot of Figure 2 , when the service rate at station A is 75% of that at station B, we see that the outcomes in the final round are split between the two herding profiles, with more than 90% of trials ending up with herding at route AB and the rest ending with herding at route BA. When the service rate at station A is less than half of that at station B (25% and 50%), in all 100 trials we see play converging to herding at route AB. These outcomes match our analytical results from Section 4; that is, the herding equilibria are the only pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the open-routing game; that a large class of learning rules will converge to one of the herding profiles; and that when the service rates differ by a factor greater than 2, route AB is a strictly dominant strategy for all customers.
We have thus far discussed examples with arrivals that are very close together (γ 0.001), which matches closely with our theoretical models. We now discuss settings for which arrivals are more spaced out in time, that is, γ ≥ 0.1. We begin by fixing µ A at 0.75, varying γ within [0.1, 1] and φ within [0, 1]. We note that in our simulations, herding on route BA never occurs when γ ≥ 0.1. Because herding at station B does not arise, the number of AB customers in the final round-more specifically, how close this number is to 50-is a reasonable measure of the strength of herding. The mean and first quartile for this quantity can be found in Table 2 , over ranges of γ and φ. We observe that all three summary statistics for the number of AB customers tend to decrease as γ increases. That is, as the arrivals occur less frequently, herding begins to dissipate. For γ ≤ 0.5 we see a marked tendency toward herding. For example, when γ 0.25, the mean number of AB customers in the final round for any φ is above 45, which is more than 90% of the total number of customers. However, once γ nears one, the herding effect is less pronounced.
Results of the simulation runs with smaller values of µ A are qualitatively similar. First, recall that our theoretical results for service networks with all customers present at the start of service tell us that route AB is a strictly dominant strategy if 2µ A ≤ µ B . Our numerical analysis suggests that this extends to cases with stochastic arrivals as well. In our simulations, we find that across all trials and for all parameter combinations such that 2µ A ≤ µ B , the minimum number of AB customers in the final round is 44. We now discuss the particular case of µ A 0.5, the summary statistics for which are reported in Table 3 . We note that every entry in Table 3 is at least 47, and that the values in Table 3 are greater than the corresponding values in Table 2 (with µ A 0.75) in all cases. This pattern of successively more prominent herding continues as µ A decreases further. Such a pattern indicates, as also suggested by the proofs establishing the herding equilibria, that an important driver of the herding behavior is the severity of the penalty of being behind one additional customer.
The outcomes of our simulation study provide strong evidence for Hypothesis 1, that is, that herding emerges when the open-routing service network is congested. Moreover, our study shows that as arrivals begin to be spaced further apart in time, herding correspondingly diminishes in prevalence, verifying our analysis in Section 8. Additionally, when the service rates are far apart (i.e., when 2µ A < µ B ), the pull to the slower station A is strong enough that herding is more robust to slower arrivals. These numerical results mirror qualitatively the theoretical results from previous sections, reinforcing the plausibility of herding in congested service systems in more realistic settings.
Conclusion
We model customer behavior for service networks in which self-interested customers require service at each station and are permitted to determine their routes through the network. In our base two-station model, customers are present in the system when service becomes available and make decisions about which station to visit first. We find that the expected system time for each customer is a submodular function, and we exploit this property throughout.
In equilibrium, customers herd at one station; that is, all of the customers take the same route through the network. This behavior is motivated by the need to avoid arriving late to the congested station. If all of the other customers are visiting the same station first, then a customer who visits the other station guarantees herself to be served last at the busy one, and she is thus better off following the crowd. However, if the service rates are far apart, then it is a dominant strategy for all players to visit the slower station first. We see also that the herding behavior is stable enough that a large class of learning rules converges to one of the herding equilibria, even if players play both strategies early on. In addition, we find from an investigation of
